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Abstract:  
In this paper, we use data on roll-call votes by MEP’s in the five elected European 
Parliaments (1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999) to evaluate the likely impact of current proposals 
in the Convention on the Future of Europe for the appointment of the European executive. We 
find (a) that the different procedures for appointing the Commission lead to quite different 
results in terms of the composition of the Commission, (b) that election of the President of the 
Commission by the national parliaments (our preferred mode of appointment) gives the result 
that is most in line with the observed composition of the Commission since 1979, whereas (c) 
election by the European Parliament creates a ‘built-in’ form of divided government between 
the Council and the Commission that could prove counterproductive for the functioning of 
European institutions.    1 
1. Introduction 
 
A key issue in the design of any constitution is how to (s)elect the executive.  It is no surprise, 
then, that one of the most controversial issues in the Convention on the Future of Europe is 
how to elect the EU’s executive: the European Commission.  Several governments, such as 
the British and French, would like to maintain the institutional status quo as established by the 
Nice Treaty – whereby the Commission is elected by (a qualified-majority of) the EU Heads 
of Government (Blair, 2002).  Against the institutional status quo, the ‘parliamentary’ model, 
where the executive is ‘fused’ to a majority in the EU legislature, seems to be the most 
popular.  For example, Germany and the Benelux have proposed that the Commission should 
be elected by the European Parliament (Fischer, 2000; Brok, 2002; Verhofstadt, 2002).  Also, 
the Commission has proposed that it should be elected by a two-thirds majority in the 
European Parliament (Commission of the EU, 2002).  More recently, the Chirac-Schroeder 
‘compromise’ proposal to have the Commission President elected by the European Parliament 
and a Council President elected by the Council has been gaining strong momentum.  So far, 
only the Irish government has considered a ‘presidential’ model (Laver et al., 1995), where 
the Commission would be elected separately from the European Parliament – either directly 
by the voters or indirectly by an electoral college of national parliaments (cf. Hix, 2002b; 
Berglöf et al., 2003). 
  The pros and cons of the parliamentary and presidential models of government are 
well-rehearsed in the political science and political economy literature (e.g. Lijphart, 1992).  
Essentially, presidential government allows for true separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branch of government.  With a formal separation-of-powers, the 
executive is unable to force the legislative majority to support its policy agenda (Shugart and 
Carey, 1992), but the executive cannot be brought down by a vote of confidence in the   2 
legislature.  In contrast, with a fusion of the legislative and executive majorities, the executive 
can force its parliamentary parties to support its policy agenda by threatening to resign, and 
hence risk a battle over the formation of a new executive (Huber, 1996; Diermeier and 
Feddersen, 1997).  This often means less policy change with a separation-of-powers than with 
parliamentary government (Tsebelis, 2002).  Also, parliamentary governments tend to 
produce more public goods but also a higher size of government and more rents to politicians 
than presidential government (cf. Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997, 2000).  Parliamentary 
government also tends to lead more easily to creeping policy centralization (Bednar et al., 
2001). 
    Rather than rehearse these theoretical debates in the EU context (cf. Crombez and Hix, 
2002), we do something completely different: we undertake a counterfactual analysis of how 
EU politics would have worked had different models of executive election been used in the 
EU since 1979.  In this counterfactual analysis we use data from voting in the European 
Parliament.  In previous research we have collected and analysed the total population of roll-
call votes in the European Parliament between 1979 and 2001: approximately 12,000 votes by 
2,000 MEPs (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2002).  From these votes we calculate ideal point 
estimates for every Member of the European Parliament (MEP) on the two main dimensions 
of EU politics (the left-right, and pro-/anti-integration), using the NOMINATE algorithm 
developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). 
  We use the ideal points of the MEPs to model election of the Commission President 
by the European Parliament in each of the five directly-elected parliaments.  We calculate the 
partisan affiliation of the Commission President under several election procedures and 
different assumptions about MEPs’ voting behaviour.  First, we allow each parliament to elect 
a single Commission President (who would then presumably put the rest of his/her team 
together, in cooperation with the governments).  This corresponds essentially to the   3 
“federalist” proposal for the Convention supported by Germany, the Benelux countries and 
supporters of a federalist Europe.  In one scenario we assume that MEPs follow the ‘whip’ of 
their party groups.  In an alternative scenario, we assume that MEPs vote according to their 
individual policy position vis-à-vis the candidates. 
  Second, we model the process of government formation in each parliament.  The 
purpose is to simulate what kinds of government a fully-fledged parliamentary Europe would 
produce.  While this scenario is not currently on the table, this is seen as a long-term desirable 
scenario by many.  Here we either assume that a government requires the support of fifty-
percent-plus-one MEPs or that a government requires the support of two-thirds of MEPs, as in 
the proposal by the Commission to the Convention.   
  We then contrast the outcomes of these different parliamentary models of EU 
government with what would have happened had a presidential model existed.  Here we 
assume that the Commission President is elected by an electoral college of national 
parliaments in the same year as a European Parliament election (Hix, 2002b).  This can be 
seen as a realistic scenario for a presidential model of Europe as the direct election of a 
European president is not being considered as a likely scenario in the current situation.
1  We 
compare these counterfactual parliamentary and presidential models with the real-world 
outcomes: the partisan make-up of the seven Commissions that were appointed between 1979 
and 1999. 
  One must of course be cautious with such a counterfactual exercise since it assumes 
implicitly that political agents (MEPs, members of national parliaments) behave the same way 
under a different institutional setup.  We know this is not the case.  Nevertheless, given the 
uncertainty surrounding the effects of any possible institutional change in the context of 
                                                 
1 Note that the first American Presidents were chosen by an electoral college constituted mostly by votes in the 
state legislatures. It is only later that universal suffrage became the norm for choosing the electoral college. 
Berglöf et al. (2003) argue that the Hix (2002b) proposal is the best suited for an evolutionary approach towards 
a presidential model of governance for Europe.    4 
Europe, we consider it useful to use all the available data to shed light on the effects of 
various proposals for the selection of the European executive.  Our database on roll-call votes 
in the European Parliament can serve exactly this purpose.  We feel that such a counterfactual 
empirical analysis, which uses a comprehensive dataset of observed behaviour, goes much 
further than mere speculation. 
The main insights from this exercise are as follows.  The composition of the 
Commission or the political colour of its president would have been different under the 
different proposals before the Convention.  If the Commission President had been elected by 
the national parliaments, a centre-right politician would have been elected between 1979 and 
1999, and a centre-left politician in 1999.  In contrast, a rather different Commission 
President would have been elected if a parliamentary model had been used.  If the EP elected 
the Commission President directly, the 1994 centre-right Santer Commission would have 
been presided over by a Socialist, and the 1999 centre-left Prodi Commission would have 
been presided over by a Conservative (reflecting the new dominance of the European People’s 
Party [EPP] in the European Parliament).  But, if the Commission had been elected by a fully-
fledged parliamentary model, a ‘grand coalition’ of Conservatives and Socialists would have 
resulted in all periods except 1999, which would have been a centre-right coalition of 
Conservatives, Liberals and Gaullists.  Finally, with a two-thirds majority, the only feasible 
coalition in all periods would have been a grand coalition of Socialists and Conservatives, and 
in some cases other parties would also have been needed.   
Basically, any parliamentary model for electing the Commission would have resulted 
in a rather different Commission than the ones chosen by the governments, and rather 
different policy outcomes.  For example, a parliamentary model may have meant that the 
Single Market Programme would not have been supported so enthusiastically by the 
Commission because throughout the 1980s the Commission would have been dominated by   5 
the centre-left!   In contrast, a quasi-presidential model, with the Commission President 
elected by national parliaments, would have produced an EU executive more similar to the 
majority in the Council yet independent from their direct influence because of the separation-
of-powers system. 
In section 2, we describe the current mechanism for the appointment of the 
Commission.  In section 3, we describe the make-up of the European Parliament since 1979.   
In section 4, we explain our five scenarios for the election of the European executive.  In 
section 5, we comment on the results obtained and discuss the merits of the various proposals 
on the table in the light of our simulations.  In section 6, we summarise the main findings and 
conclude in favour of the election of the Commission President by national parliaments. 
 
 
2. How the Commission is Currently Elected: Unanimity in the European Council 
 
Under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission is chosen by ‘common accord’ amongst the EU 
Heads of Government.  In practice this has meant that the Commission has been elected by 
unanimity amongst the EU governments.  The governments appoint the Commission 
President by unanimity, each government then nominates its own Commissioners, the 
governments then formally adopt the College of Commissioners by unanimity. 
In the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament was given the right to be 
‘consulted’ on the governments’ nominee for Commission President – which the Parliament 
interpreted as a formal right to veto the proposed candidate (Hix, 2002a).  In the 1999 
Amsterdam Treaty, the governments formally granted the Parliament a right to veto the 
governments’ choice both of the Commission President and of the Commission as a whole.  
Finally, in the Nice Treaty, with the prospect of enlargement of the EU to twenty-five or more   6 
member states, the governments maintained their monopoly on the nomination of the 
Commission, but agreed that the appointment should be made by a qualified-majority in the 
European Council rather than by unanimity. 
  However, as the Nice Treaty only entered into force in 2002, no Commission has been 
elected using the qualified-majority rule.  The Santer Commission was the only executive to 
be elected under the Maastricht Treaty procedure, and the Prodi Commission was the only 
executive to be elected under the Amsterdam Treaty procedure.  The next Commission, 
elected after the 2004 European elections will probably be the only executive elected under 
the Nice (qualified-majority) rules, as the next-but-one-Commission (probably in 2009) will 
be chosen under the rules established in the new EU constitution (assuming that the Nice 
status quo is changed). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The use of unanimity in the European Council has meant that the Commission has 
always reflected the partisan make-up of the governments at the time of the election of the 
Commission.  The Commission is supposed to be politically neutral.  But, there have been 
political shifts in the composition of the Commission over time as the political composition of 
national governments has shifted.  As Table 1 shows, the centre-right majority in the Council 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s produced a centre-right majority in the six 
Commissions in this period (Thorn, Jenkins, Delors I, Delors II, Delors III, and Santer).  Even 
though Jenkins and Delors were Socialists, Table 1 shows that the socialists only formed 38 
percent of the Jenkins Commission, and respectively 43, 41 and 29 percent in the three Delors 
Commissions.  All other Commissioners came from the centre- right.  Similarly, the centre-
left majority in the Council in the late 1990s produced a centre-left majority in the Prodi   7 
Commission: which has 55 percent of Commissioners on the left (Socialist or Green), and 45 
percent of Commission on the right (Liberal, EPP or non-EPP Conservatives).   
Also, it should be pointed out that although the Commission seeks to reach consensus 
when proposing legislation, formally it can decide by a simple-majority (with the 
Commission President holding the casting vote).  As a result, the party-political make-up of 
the Commission does make a difference.  For example, the single market project of the late 
1980s and early 1990s was driven by centre-right majority in the Council, supported by a 
centre-right majority in the Commission – despite the existence of a Socialist (Delors) at the 
helm.  Similarly, in the late 1990s the drive to introduce a series of directives in the social 
affairs field (on working time, workers consultation, non-discrimination on the grounds of 
race etc.) was pursued by centre-left majorities in the Commission and Council, against a 
centre-right majority in the post-1999 European Parliament. 
The question, then, is how would this have been different had the Commission been 
elected by the European Parliament rather than the Council?  To do this, we first look at the 
evolution of the composition of the European Parliament since 1979.  
 
 
3. The European Parliament Since 1979 
 
Table 2 shows the partisan make-up of the European Parliament just after each of the five 
direct-elections.  The first two parliaments had slight centre-right majorities, with the 
European People’s Party (EPP), the French Gaullists and their allies (GAU), the British 
Conservatives and their allies (CON), and the Liberals (LIB) commanding 58 percent and 51 
percent of the seats, respectively.  The third parliament was evenly balanced, with the parties 
on the left – the Socialists (SOC), Greens (GRN), Radical Left (LEFT) and Regionalists   8 
(REG) (who were mostly on the left) – commanding 48 percent of the seats compared to 47 
percent for the parties on the right.  This was also the case in the fourth parliament, with both 
the left and right on 44 percent.  Finally, in the fifth parliament, the centre-right returned to 
the majority, with just over 50 percent of the seats. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
  On that arithmetic basis alone, it would be difficult to tell what majority would form in 
each parliament, especially in the evenly-balanced third and fourth parliaments.  Even when 
there seems to be a clear arithmetic majority, as in the fifth parliament, one must however also 
be careful since the left-right dimension is clearly not the only relevant dimension for the 
formation of political coalitions in EU politics.  This is especially in the European Parliament, 
where research on individual-level MEP voting behaviour finds that both the left-right and the 
pro- and anti-European integration dimensions are salient (e.g. Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999; 
Hix, 2001; Noury, 2002; Noury & Roland, 2002).   
As a result, looking at individual level voting behaviour in the parliament provides a 
more accurate picture on which to base a counterfactual analysis.  Figure 1 shows the result of 
applying the NOMINATE method of individual legislator ideal point estimate to all 2,124 
roll-call votes in the first half (1999-2001) of the fifth parliament.  Each dot in the figure 
represents the ‘revealed’ ideal point of an individual MEP on the two main dimensions of EU 
politics: left-right (with –1.0 the furthest left and +1.0 the furthest right) and pro-/anti-
integration (with –1.0 the most anti-integration and +1.0 the most pro-integration).  The 
distance between any two MEPs reveals the frequency with which these two legislators voted 
together.  If two MEPs are in exactly the same point, they voted exactly the same way in   9 
every vote in this period, whereas if the MEPs are at opposite ends on both dimensions, then 
they voted on different sides on every issue. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
As the figure reveals, most party groups in the fifth parliament where relatively 
cohesive, with the MEPs in these groups tightly bunched around a party median.  The 
NOMINATE results clearly show the left-right spectrum on the first (horizontal) dimension: 
Green and Radical Left at the extreme Left, the Socialists to the Left and the EPP to the right. 
Also, the location of the Liberals approximately half-way between the two main groups 
reveals that these MEPs voted as much with the Socialists as with the European People’s 
Party when issues split the parliament along left-right lines.  Nonetheless, the MEPs’ 
positions on the second dimension reveal that the three main groups (SOC, EPP and LIB) 
tended to vote together against the smaller groups of the extreme left and right as well as the 
Gaullists when issues split the parliament on pro-/anti-integration lines. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 shows the mean position of the party groups on these two dimensions in all 
five parliaments.  The position of the Liberals is particularly interesting.  The distances 
between this group and the Socialists and EPP on the first dimension shows that the Liberals 
voted more with the right in the first three parliaments, but voted more or less equally with the 
these two main parties in the fourth and fifth parliaments. 
  From the individual MEP NOMINATE scores we calculate the two-dimensional 
Euclidean distance between each MEP in each parliament.  This information allows us to   10 
construct a series of counterfactual scenarios about who would have governed Europe had the 
European Parliament had the power to elect the EU executive. 
 
 
4. Five Scenarios for Electing the EU Executive 
 
Using the two-dimensional MEPs’ NOMINATE scores we model four different scenarios of 
an election of the Commission by the European Parliament. 
  In the first scenario we assume that the parliament elects the Commission President 
(and that the College of Commissioners is then formed subsequently), and that MEPs follow 
the voting instructions of their European Parliament party groups.  This is a reasonable 
approximation of how roll-call voting in the parliament works in practice.  In roll-call votes, 
how each MEP has voted is recorded in the minutes, and can hence be monitored by the party 
group leaders.  In previous research, we found high levels of party group cohesion in roll-call 
votes in all five parliaments, and increased voting along party lines and decreased voting 
along national lines over time (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2002; Noury and Roland, 2002). 
  To operationalize this we assume that each party group nominates a candidate, and 
that the election of the Commission President is conducted as a multi-round contest, with the 
candidate with the lowest votes being eliminated in each round, and the contest continuing 
until a candidate has secured fifty-percent-plus-one of the votes.
2  From the NOMINATE 
positions of the MEPs, we calculated the median position of each party group on each 
dimension, and chose the MEPs closest to these locations as the candidates of each group.  
We then calculated the two-dimensional Euclidean distance of each party group from these 
                                                 
2 This style of multi-round contest is the method the European Parliament uses for electing its senior offices, 
such as the President of the Parliament, and hence is probably how the parliament would chose to elect a 
Commission President.   11 
candidates, and assumed that each party group votes en bloc for the candidate closest to its 
two-dimensional median position. 
  In the second scenario the Parliament still elects the Commission President, but this 
time we assume that MEPs vote according to their personal ideological positions in the two-
dimensional space of EU politics.  This assumption can be justified as an approximation of 
what might happen if the vote were taken by secret ballot, which would free the MEPs from 
pressure from either their national party leaders or their European Parliament party groups.
3  
For example, in implementing the Nice Treaty, the European Parliament changed its rules of 
procedure (in July 2002), so that the vote in the European Parliament on the nominee for 
Commission President (who would be chosen by a qualified-majority in the European 
Council) would be by secret ballot rather than by roll-call. 
  To operationalize this we again assume that each party group nominates a candidate, 
and that the election is conducted as a multi-round contest.  However, from the NOMINATE 
positions of the MEPs, we calculated the two-dimensional Euclidean distance of each MEP 
from these candidates, and assumed that each MEP votes for the candidate closest to his/her 
two-dimensional location. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Table 4 illustrates how these two scenarios play out in the fifth parliament.   
Interesting, if the MEPs follow party groups lines, the candidate of the EPP would win the 
contest.  But, if the MEPs vote independently, the candidate of the Liberals would sneak 
through to beat the EPP candidate in the final round.  These are not unreasonable outcomes if 
                                                 
3 Another possible assumption could be that MEPs vote along national party lines.  However, in practice this 
would be almost identical to MEPs voting according to their personal positions.  This is because most national 
party delegations of MEPs are highly cohesive, which means that MEPs from the same national party tend to 
have very similar NOMINATE scores.   12 
one considers that an EPP candidate (Nicole Fontaine) was elected President of the 
Parliament for the first half of this parliament’s term and a Liberal candidate (Pat Cox) was 
elected President for the second half of the parliament’s term.  Looking more closely at Table 
4 allows us to understand the difference between both scenarios.  In the first scenario, the 
Anti-Europeans (ANTI) get an important head-start, as the Gaullists drop out and support the 
Anti-Europeans in round 2.  In round 3, the Radical Left drop out in favour of the Greens.  
The Liberals are the smallest group in that round and drop out in favour of the EPP in round 
4.  The EPP in turn benefits in round 5 from support from the Gaullists to get an absolute 
majority against the Socialist and Green candidates.  In the second scenario, the Liberals are 
able to exploit their pivotal position in the parliament to attract votes in successive rounds 
from the MEPs to their left against the EPP candidate.  
  In the third scenario, we assume that the parliament elects the Commission as a whole, 
through a process of ‘government formation’ amongst the groups in the parliament – 
modelled on the classic parliamentary model of government formation in the domestic arena 
in Europe.   
To operationalize this we assume that only ‘connected’ coalitions can form: where 
party groups prefer coalition partners that a closest to them over coalition partners that are 
further away.  To work out which coalition is the most likely to form, we assume that each 
party group has a probability of being chosen as the coalition formateur in relation to their 
proportion of seats in the parliament.  We then calculate the ideal ‘minimum-connected-
winning’ coalition preference of each party.  The formateur forms a coalition with the party 
closest to it first (in terms of a two-dimensional Euclidean distance), then the next closest 
second, and so on until the coalition partners command fifty-percent-plus-one of the seats.  
But, if a party group takes the coalition partner well over the fifty-percent-plus-one threshold, 
and any parties in the coalition are surplus for a minimal-winning majority, then these surplus   13 
parties are dropped, in order of the furthest away first.  Finally, if two parties form the same 
winning-coalition, we calculate the probability of this government forming as the combined 
probabilities of these parties being chosen as formateurs (in other words, the combined 
proportion of seats of these two parties). 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Table 5 illustrates how this scenario works in the fifth parliament.  If the EPP is the 
formateur, it chooses the Liberals (LIB) first, then chooses the Gaullists (GAU) to bring the 
coalition over the fifty-percent threshold.  In contrast, the Socialists choose the Liberals first, 
then the Greens (GRN), then the EPP.  But, at this point, the Liberals and Greens are surplus 
to a minimum-winning coalition, which means that the preferred coalition of the Socialists is 
a SOC-EPP ‘grand coalition’.  However, because the Liberals and Gaullists would form the 
same coalition as the EPP, the EPP-LIB-GAU is the most likely simple-majority-winning 
government to be formed in the fifth parliament, with a probability of 50.4 percent. 
  In the fourth scenario, we assume an identical process of government formation 
(through a minimum-connected-winning-coalition), but that the coalition must command two-
thirds support in the parliament, rather than a simple majority – in other words, as a way of 
operationalizing the Commission’s proposal to the Convention. 
  Finally, in a fifth scenario we assume a separation of powers between the Commission 
and the Parliament, and that the Commission President is elected via an electoral college of 
national parliaments in the same year as the European Parliament election (cf. Hix, 2002b; 
Berglöf et al. 2003).  To operationalize this we assume that each European party (as 
constituted by the party groups in the parliament) proposes a candidate.  National parties vote 
en bloc for the candidate that is put forward by the party group in which they sit in the   14 
European Parliament.  We start from the number of MPs each national party had at the time of 
the European Parliament election (June 1979, June 1984, June 1989, June 1994, and June 
1999).  The votes of each national party are then weighted by the proportion of MEPs from 
their member state (in other words, each national party has a proportion of votes equal to their 
proportion of national MPs multiplied by the proportion of MEPs from their member state).   
The contest is held over two rounds, with the two candidates winning the most votes 
in the first round going through to a run-off contest.  In practice this means a run-off between 
the Socialist and EPP candidates.  In the second round, we assume that the national parties to 
the left of the Liberals vote for the Socialist candidate and the national parties to the right of 
the Liberals vote for the EPP candidate.  Where the Liberals are concerned, we assume that 
the ‘social liberal’ parties (the British Liberal Democrats, Dutch D’66, Danish Radikale 
Venstre, Italian Radicals, Swedish Centre Party, and Finnish KESK) vote for the Socialist 
candidate, while all the other Liberal parties vote for the EPP candidate. 
 
TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6 illustrates how such a ‘presidential’ election amongst national MPs would 




5. Results and Analysis 
 
Table 8 gives the summary results for the five scenarios for each of the five parliaments 
elected since 1979.    15 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
  The first line shows the result of the election of the Commission President by the 
European Parliament assuming party group discipline.  The Commission President would 
have been a Conservative in all Parliaments except the 1994 Parliament, which would have 
been elected a Socialist Commission President.  Note that such predictions cannot be made 
readily from the arithmetic composition of the European Parliament.  For example, the shift in 
the position of the Liberals to the left in the fourth Parliament is the key factor that would 
have led to the election of a Socialist Commission President in this period.  Note also that for 
the last two parliaments, the political colour of the Commission President would have been 
different from the political colour of the actual Commission.  This is explained by the fact that 
the European Parliament elections are often protest votes against incumbent governments. 
Thus the fourth parliament was more to the left in the late 1980s and early 1990s when most 
European governments were on the centre-right, and then the European Parliament shifted 
strongly to the centre-right in the 1999 elections when Social Democrats where in government 
in most European countries.  
  The second line of the Table shows the outcome of a European Parliament election of 
the Commission President assuming no party group discipline (in other words, if a vote were 
taken by secret ballot).  The main difference with the party discipline scenario is that in the 
third and fifth parliaments, a Liberal President would have been elected, as a result of the 
pivotal position of the Liberals in these parliaments (see Hix, Noury and Roland, 2002).  
  The third line shows the most likely coalition if the Commission were a normal 
parliamentary government; in other words, a coalition enjoying a simple majority in the 
European Parliament.  It is striking to see that in most parliaments, there would have been a   16 
grand coalition between the Socialists and EPP.  In the second parliament, however, the 
winning coalition would have been on the left: between the Socialists, Liberals, Radical Left 
and Regionalists.  Only the 1999 Commission would have been a right-wing coalition, of the 
Conservatives, Liberals and Gaullists.   
The fourth line shows the coalition outcome with a two-thirds majority rule.  The 
Socialists and Conservatives would again have to have been part of all coalitions, but the 
Radical Left would also have been part of the first two coalitions and the Liberals part of the 
last two.   
In sum, the parliamentary model would have produced EU governed at the centre by 
the two big parties, possibly adjoined by a third.  This is not a terribly exciting prospect in 
terms of democratic competition for executive office and alternation of governments.  A 
parliamentary model in the EU would not produce a clear opposition force, which would not 
be good for the democratic accountability of the incumbents.  Moreover, even with a 50 
percent majority rule, the Radical Left would have been part of the 1984 Commission.  This 
means that the Single Market Programme, pursued and implemented by the Commission in 
that period, would probably not have taken place! 
  The fifth line shows the result of the election of the Commission President in a two-
round election by national parliaments.  The Commission President would have been a 
member of the EPP in the first four periods and a Socialist in the fifth period.  Note that this is 
the only scenario that follows closely the actual composition of the Commission.  This is not 
surprising since the composition of the Council, that determined the composition of the actual 
Commission, is based on governing majorities in national parliaments.  
  We believe the above simulations are the most accurate to date and exploit data on the 
composition of the European Parliament as well as national parliaments at the time of the 
European Parliament elections.  Table 8 shows that the various scenarios for appointment of   17 
the Commission do lead to different results.  The main difference we observe in Table 8 is 
between the parliamentary scenarios (lines 1 to 4) and the presidential scenario (line 5).  This 
difference is very much related to the fact that elections for the European Parliaments have 
been fought as ‘second-order national contests’, tending to favour the opposition parties in 
member states (van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996).  This means that a parliamentary mode of 
selection of the Commission would tend to lead to a political composition of the Commission 
that would be very different from the political composition in the Council at the time of the 
appointment of the Commission.  In our view, this ‘built-in’ form of ‘divided government’ 
would lead to unnecessary clashes between the Commission and the Council, which could be 
unproductive for the functioning of the European Union.  
  The above reasoning is however subject to several objections.  First of all, voters may 
change their behaviour when voting for the European Parliament once the latter has the power 
to appoint the European executive.  This is quite possible.  However, one can expect a high 
degree of inertia in voting behaviour in European elections, particularly when one considers 
the incentives of national political parties in these contests – who would still desire to use 
European elections as national referendums on the performance of national governments 
(rather than of European government) regardless of whether these contests have an impact on 
the make-up of the Commission.  As a result, elections for the European Parliament are likely 
to be second-order contests for quite some time, thus making the ‘divided government’ effect 
quite likely at least in the first few decades of the EU Constitution.   
Second, the effect we are describing may be exaggerated since national elections take 
place continuously between two elections for the European Parliament.  It is thus not clear 
whether on average one would observe forms of divided government or not.  However, it is 
not impossible that national elections will become increasingly synchronized over time. 
Moreover, the ‘divided government’ effect would take place at the beginning of the tenure of   18 
each Commission, a most critical moment where a grace period would be needed to allow the 
new Commission a chance to get some legislation through.  
Third, the ‘divided government’ effect would be limited if the rest of the Commission 
were appointed by the Council – as in our first scenario, where the European Parliament 
simply elects the Commission President.  However, even in this case, the Commission 
President would be viewed with suspicion in the Council in the beginning of its tenure.  This 
would not bode well for the legitimacy of the Commission.  On the contrary, it is important 
that the Commission and the Council have a good working relationship to have a smooth 
functioning of the EU institutions.  From this point of view, the presidential model is clearly 
better. 
Does this mean that the European executive should continue to be elected by the 
Council?  Not at all.  We think there is a fundamental difference between the election by a 
majority in the Council and by a majority in national parliaments.  Election of the 
Commission President by national parliaments gives the European executive a legitimacy that 
is independent from the Council.  Independence of the Commission from a political majority 
in either of the EU’s legislative institutions – the Council and the European Parliament – has 
been vital for the functioning of the EU, as this allows governments to make credible 
commitments to each other by delegating agenda-setting and implementation to a political 
actor which is not controlled by a particular faction in the legislature (esp. Dehousse, 1995; 
Majone, 1996, 2002; Pollack, 1997; Moravcsik, 1999).   
In our opinion, though, independence of the Commission has not been secured 
because of particular legal requirements in the Treaty, where Article 213 states that ‘The 
Members of the Commission shall … be completely independent in the performance of their 
duties’.  Rather, independence has been secured because prior to the Nice Treaty the 
Commission was elected by a unanimity rule in the Council (cf. Crombez and Hix, 2002).    19 
The fact that a much larger majority was required for electing the executive than for 
implementing its legislative proposals in practice meant a separation-of-powers system in the 
EU.  Once the same majorities are used for both electing the Commission and for 
implementing its proposals – as would be the case either with the Nice Treaty reform (where 
the Commission would be elected by a qualified-majority in the Council) or if the 
Commission were elected by a majority in the European Parliament – there would be an end 
to the separation-of-powers system.  This would mean an end to the independence of the 
Commission, and an end to the ability of governments to delegate to an executive body that is 
not captured by a legislative majority. 
Moreover, the election of the president by national parliaments can be established 
through an ‘electoral college’ system, where each member state has a particular number of 
electoral college votes, which would reflect state interests as well as population size.  A big 
advantage of such a system is that votes in national parliaments could be replaced by 
universal suffrage by the countries who choose so (Hix, 2002b; Berglöf et al., 2003).  This 
could pave the way for the election of the President of the Commission by universal suffrage 
in the future.  It is crucial however that each national parliament would have a number of 
electoral college votes equal to their representation in national parliaments and these votes 
would be proportional to the ballot result in each national parliament.  Such proportionality 
avoids a ‘winner take all’ outcome in individual countries, as is the case with US states.  This 
may seem like a detail of electoral law but it would avoid situations like the recent US 
presidential election where flaws in Florida’s election decided the outcome of the presidency 
because a few thousand votes gave George W. Bush the electoral college vote for all Florida. 
By introducing this proportional rule, candidates for presidency would have to campaign in 
each country to gain votes, thereby avoiding the danger that individual countries would feel 
left out. Thus in this scenario, if votes are divided 51-49 percent in France between say a   20 
Socialist and a Conservative candidate, the electoral college votes of France would also be 
divided 51-49 percent among the two candidates. 
There are a number of arguments that favour the choice of a presidential rather than a 
parliamentary system for Europe in the long run (see Berglöf et al., 2003 for a thorough 
discussion).  First of all, a presidential system has strong accountability effects for the 
executive.  The incumbent can more easily be punished in elections and replaced by a 
challenger.  In a parliamentary system, the Conservatives and Socialists would tend to be part 
of most coalitions.  They would thus fear less punishment by voters, which would make them 
less accountable.  Second, a presidential system would have more executive effectiveness 
than a parliamentary system.  The latter would always be a form of coalition government and 
decisions would have to be continuously negotiated within the coalition.  More often than not, 
decisions would be made too late, as is often the case with coalition governments.  Another 
advantage of the presidential over the parliamentary system is that it allow a genuine 
separation-of-powers between the executive branch and the legislative branch of government. 
This allow better checks and balances between both.  Moreover, it leads to more decentralized 
forms of legislation: majorities on bills form on a case-by-case basis rather than on the basis 
of majority and opposition.  This ensures that no group will systematically be in the minority.   
The presidential system is less desirable when it comes to global expenditure 
programs like welfare programs – where parliamentary systems tend to produce more 
economic redistribution and public goods.  However, this is not a big disadvantage in the EU 
context, as strong welfare states already exist at the domestic level in Europe, where member 
states have parliamentary models of government.   
All in all, there is a case to be made for a presidential form of governance for Europe. 
Having the President of the Commission elected by national parliaments would be a good first 





In this paper, we used data from the European Parliament and national parliaments to ask 
what would have been the political composition of the Commission in 1979, 1984, 1989, 
1994 and 1999 according to various scenarios currently proposed in the Convention on the 
Future of Europe.  The main findings of this analysis can be summarised as follows.   
First, the political character of the Commission would have been different had 
different rules been used to elect the EU executive.  As we know from the political science 
and political economy literature, rules governing the election of the executive make a 
difference.  These rules determine the political/partisan colour of the executive, which in turn 
shapes policy outcomes.  Under the status quo procedures (pre-Nice), a centre-right majority 
in the Council meant a centre-right majority in the Commission, which in turn meant a liberal 
Single Market Programme and monetarist plan for Economic and Monetary Union supported 
by these two institutions.  A different executive-selection procedure could have produced a 
Commission with a different political orientation, which would have meant different EU 
policies and institutional relations between the Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament.  Hence, when considering which selection procedure is best for the EU, one needs 
to consider what policies one wants from the EU, and what type of relationships does one 
desire between the Commission and the Council and European Parliament. 
Second, if the Commission President had been elected by the national parliaments, he 
or she would have been a representative of the centre-right alliance of Christian Democrats 
and Conservatives (the European People’s Party [EPP]) in all periods except the present one 
(1999 to today), where he would have been a representative of the Socialists (SOC).    22 
Interestingly, the presidential scenario closely follows the actual political composition of the 
Commission since 1979; where the Commission was dominated by the centre-right until the 
current Prodi Commission.  
Third, and in contrast, the colour of the Commission President would have been very 
different if he/she had been elected by the European Parliament.  For example, if MEPs vote 
along party lines, the European Parliament would have elected a Socialists in 1994 instead of 
the centre-right Jacques Santer, and a Conservative in 1999 instead centrist Romano Prodi.  
But, if MEPs follow their personal preferences, the European Parliament would have elected a 
Liberal Commission President in 1989 and 1999.  If the Commission had been elected by a 
fully-fledged parliamentary model, a ‘grand coalition’ of Conservatives and Socialists would 
have been the most likely outcome, except in 1999, when a centre-right coalition of 
Conservatives, Liberals and Gaullists (GAU) would have results.  And, with a two-thirds 
majority, Socialists and Conservatives would have been part of all coalitions, but other parties 
would have to have been included in all parliaments except 1989 to secure a large enough 
majority.    
Overall, any form of parliamentary model for electing the Commission would have 
produced a Commission with a very different partisan hue than the Commissions that were 
chosen by the EU governments.  This is related to the fact that elections in the European 
Parliament are often protest votes against incumbent governments, which ensures that the 
political majorities in the Council and the Parliament are different.  Any form of appointment 
of the European executive by the European Parliament would thus tend to create a built-in 
bias towards a political composition of the Commission that would be different from the 
political composition in the Council.  This would create unnecessary conflicts between the 
Council and the Commission, which would be harmful for the EU, since one of the main 
objectives of the Convention is to make the Commission more accountable and to reduce the   23 
democratic deficit.  Election of the Commission President by national parliaments would 
avoid this conflict while strongly enhancing the democratic accountability of the Commission 
and create an original system of separation of powers for Europe. 
One effect driving these results is that the composition of the European Parliament is 
determined by a ‘protest vote’.  Thus, centre-right dominated fifth parliament was elected at a 
time when most European governments where on the left.  On the other hand, election of the 
Commission President by national parliaments will tend to reflect the majorities in national 
parliaments at the time of the vote.  As we discussed, election of the Commission President by 
national parliaments will have the advantage of a clear separation-of-powers and give the 
European Parliament a clear autonomy with respect to the European executive.  Our 
simulations show that the presidential model is less likely to lead to political clashes between 
the Council and the Commission, a clear danger with any appointment of the Commission by 
the European Parliament.  
  While we have emphasized the disadvantages of forms of appointment of the 
European executive by the European Parliament, the worst of all possible worlds would be the 
Chirac-Schroeder institutional compromise, where the Commission President is elected by the 
European Parliament and a new single Council President is elected by the Council.  This 
would create a dual executive with competing mandates, which could be disastrous for the 
EU, as has been pointed out by various commentators (such as Berglöf et al., 2003).  
Furthermore, as our analysis shows, this conflict would be exacerbated by the fact that the 
Presidents of the Commission and Council would in all likelihood be from opposite sides of 
the political divide.   
If the Convention delegates were truly wise they would not choose either this flawed 
compromise or the parliamentary model but would instead opt for a presidential model of 
government for Europe.  24 
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Table 1. Partisan Make-Up of the European Commission, 1977-2004 
 
JENKINS  THORN  DELORS I  DELORS II  DELORS III  SANTER  PRODI 
1977-1980  1981-1984  1985-1988  1989-1992  1993-1994  1995-1999  2000-2004 
Socialist-38%  Socialist-50%  Socialist-43%  Socialist-41%  Socialist-29%  Socialist-45%  Socialist-50% 
Cheysson (Fra)  Cheysson (Fra)  Delors (Fra)  Marin (Spa)  Millan (UK)  Bjerregaard (Den)  Busquin (Bel) 
Davignon (Bel)  Contogeorgis (Gre)  Cheysson (Fra)  Delors (Fra)  Delors (Fra)  Cresson (Fra)  Diamantopoulou (Gre) 
Giolitti (Ita)  Dalsager (Den)  Clinton Davis (UK)  Dondelinger (Lux)  Marin (Spa)  Gradin (Swe)  Kinnock (UK) 
Jenkins (UK)  Davignon (Bel)  Narjes (Ger)  Millan (UK)  Ruberti (Ita)  Kinnock (UK)  Lamy (Fra) 
Vredeling (Net)  Giolitti (Ita)  Ripa di Meana (Ita)  Papandreau (Gre)  Van Miert (Bel)  Liikanen (Fin)  Liikanen (Fin) 
  Narjes (Ger)  Varfis (Gre)  Ripa di Meana (Ita)    Marin (Spa)  Nielson (Den) 
  Richard (UK)       Van Miert (Bel)    Papoutsis (Gre)  Solbes Mira (Spa) 
          Van Miert (Bel)  Verheugen (Ger) 
          Wulf-Mathies (Ger)  Vitorino (Por) 
            Wallstrom (Swe) 
             
            Green-5% 
            Schreyer (Ger) 
             
Liberal-15%  Liberal-7%  Liberal-14%  Liberal-18%  Liberal-18%  Liberal-10%  Liberal-10% 
Brunner (Ger)  Thorn (Lux)  Christophersen (Den)  Bangemann (Ger)  Bangemann (Ger)  Bangemann (Ger)  Blokestein (Net) 
Gundelack (Den)    De Clercq (Bel)  Cardoso e Cunha (Por)  Christophersen (Den)  Bonino (Ita)  Prodi (Ita) 
      Christophersen (Den)  Deus Pinhiero (Por)     
             
EPP-31%  EPP-21%  EPP-43%  EPP-35%  EPP-47%  EPP-30%  EPP-30% 
Burke (Ire)  Andriessen (Net)  Andriessen (Net)  Andriessen (Net)  Brittan (UK)  Brittan (UK)  Barnier (Fra) 
Haferkamp (Ger)  Haferkamp (Ger)  Cockfield (UK)  Brittan (UK)  Matutes (Spa)  Deus Pinhiero (Por)  de Palacio (Spa) 
Natali (Ita)  Natali (Ita)  Mosar (Luz)  Matutes (Spa)  Paleokrassas (Gre)  Fischler (Aus)  Fischler (Aus) 
Vouel (Lux)    Natali (Ita)  Pandolfi (Ita)  Schmidhuber (Ger)  Oreja (Spa)  Monti (Ita) 
    Pfeiffer (Ger)      Schmidhuber (Ger)  Schrivener (Fra)  Santer (Lux)  Patten (UK) 
    Sutherland (Ire)  Schrivener (Fra)  Steichen (Lux)  Van den Broek (Net)  Reding (Lux) 
        Van den Broek (Net)     
        Vanni d'Archirafi (Ita)     
             
Other Right-15%  Other Right-21%  Other Right-0%  Other Right-6%  Other Right-6%  Other Right-15%  Other Right-5% 
Ortoli (Fra)  O'Kenedy (Ire)    MacSharry (Ire)  Flynn (Ire)  de Silguy (Fra)  Byrne (Ire) 
Tugendhart (UK)  Ortoli (Fra)        Flynn (Ire)   
   Tugendhart (UK)           Monti (Ita)      28 
Table 2. Partisan Make-Up of the European Parliament, 1979-1999 
 
 
    EP1-1979  EP2-1984  EP3-1989  EP4-1994  EP5-1999 
Party Family  Abbr.  N  %  N  %  N  %  N  %  N  % 
Socialists  SOC  106  26.5  131  30.2  197  38.0  197  34.7  176  28.1 
Christian Democrats/Conservatives  EPP  108  27.0  109  25.1  162  31.3  168  29.6  231  36.9 
Liberals  LIB  40  10.0  32  7.4  46  8.9  31  5.5  51  8.1 
French Gaullists and allies  GAU  22  5.5  30  6.9  21  4.1  29  5.1  32  5.1 
Radical Left  LEFT  42  10.5  41  9.4  15  2.9  28  4.9  42  6.7 
Regionalists  REG  13  3.3  19  4.4  13  2.5  21  3.7     
British Conservatives and allies  CON  62  15.5  49  11.3             
Radical Right  RIGHT      16  3.7  12  2.3         
Greens  GRN          26  5.0  22  3.9  48  7.7 
Anti-Europeans  ANTI              15  2.6  17  2.7 
Italian Conservatives  FE              24  4.2     
Non-attached  NA  7  1.8  7  1.6  26  5.0  32  5.6  29  4.6 
Total    410    434    518    567    626     29 
Figure 1.  NOMINATE Plot of MEP Locations in the Fifth EP   30 
Table 3. Mean Party Group NOMINATE Scores, 1979-1999 
 
 
Party  EP1-1979  EP2-1984  EP3-1989  EP4-1994  EP5-1999 
(Left to Right)  D1  D2  D1  D2  D1  D2  D1  D2  D1  D2 
GRN          -.705  -.674  -.751  -.530  -.789  -.195 
LEFT  -.318  -.210  -.385  -.194  -.361  -.420  -.605  -.634  -.749  -.452 
REG  -.570  .005  -.652  -.283  -.404  -.729  -.283  -.376     
SOC  -.074  .359  -.373  .172  -.107  .758  -.301  .709  -.307  .600 
ANTI              .361  -.812  -.090  -.689 
NA  .167  -.189  -.061  -.288  .203  -.392  .564  -.600  -.005  -.510 
LIB  .416  -.338  .398  .023  .280  -.314  .157  -.253  .016  .014 
EPP  .518  -.275  .429  -.102  .483  .214  .537  .420  .494  -.001 
GAU  .257  -.824  .542  -.615  .519  -.764  .684  -.492  .104  -.562 
FE              .652  -.224     
CON  .808  .533  .524  .796             
RIGHT      .847  -.187  .813  -.565         
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 Table 4. Counterfactual Election of the Commission President by the Fifth Parliament, using NOMINATE scores (July 1999) 
 
 
Scenario 1. MEPs Voting Along EP Group Lines (in Two Dimensions) 
 
Party  MEPs  Med.-D1  Med.-D2  Round 1  Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5 
EPP  231  .494  -.001  231  231  231  286  336 
SOC  176  -.307  .600  176  176  176  176  176 
LIB  51  .016  .014  59  61  61     
GRN  48  -.789  -.195  48  48  94  94  114 
LEFT  42  -.749  -.452  46  46       
GAU  32  .104  -.562  32         
ANTI  17  -.090  -.684  34  64  64  70   




Scenario 2. MEPs Voting According to their Individual NOMINATE Positions (in Two Dimensions) 
 
Party  MEPs  Round 1  Round 2  Round 3  Round 4  Round 5  Round 6 
EPP  231  230  230  230  234  234  234 
SOC  176  175  175  175  175  175   
LIB  51  64  64  65  113  217  392 
GRN  48  47  47         
LEFT  42  48  48  94  104     
GAU  32  32  62  62       
ANTI  17  30           
Non-attached MEPs  29             
 
   32 
 
Table 5. Counterfactual Coalition Government Formation in the Fifth European Parliament, using NOMINATE scores (July 1999) 
 
 
  Two-Dimensional Euclidean Distance Between the Groups  MEPs   
Formateur  EPP  SOC  LIB  GRN  LEFT  GAU  ANTI   (%)  Preferred Minimal-Winning Coalition (>50%) 
EPP   0  1.002  .478  1.297  1.322  .684  .899  37.2  EPP-LIB-GAU 
SOC  1.002  0  .669  .930  1.141  1.233  1.303  28.4  SOC-EPP 
LIB  .478  .670  0  .831  .895  .583  .707  8.1  LIB-EPP-GAU 
GRN  1.297  .930  .831  0  .259  .965  .853  7.7  GRN-LEFT-LIB-SOC 
LEFT  1.322  1.141  .895  .259  0  .860  .699  6.7  LEFT-GRN-ANTI-GAU-SOC 
GAU  .684  1.233  .583  .965  .860  0  .229  5.1  GAU-LIB-EPP 
ANTI  .899  1.303  .707  .853  .699  .229  0  2.7  ANTI-GAU-LEFT-EPP 
    Most Probable Winning Coalition =  50.4  EPP-LIB-GAU 
 Table 6. Example of a National Parliament Election of the Commission President, 1999 
 
National 























Germany              Greece         
SPD  298  44.5 15.8  7.04  SOC  SOC    PASOK  162 54.0 4.0  2.16  SOC  SOC 
CDU/CSU  245  36.6 15.8  5.79  EPP  EPP    ND  108 36.0 4.0  1.44  EPP  EPP 
Grune  47  7.0 15.8  1.11  GRN  SOC    KKE/SYN  30 10.0 4.0  0.40  LEFT  SOC 
FDP  43  6.4 15.8  1.02  LIB  EPP    Portugal         
PDS  36  5.4 15.8  0.85  LEFT  SOC    PS  115 50.0 4.0  2.00  SOC  SOC 
France              PSD  81 35.2 4.0  1.41  EPP  EPP 
PS+allies  283  49.4 13.9  6.86  SOC  SOC    CDU/PRD  19 8.3 4.0  0.33  LEFT  SOC 
RPR  140  24.4 13.9  3.40  GAU  EPP    PP  15 6.5 4.0  0.26  GAU  EPP 
PR+UDF  113  19.7 13.9  2.74  EPP  EPP    Sweden         
PCF  36  6.3 13.9  0.87  LEFT  SOC    SAP  131 37.5 3.5  1.32  SOC  SOC 
NF  1  0.2 13.9  0.02  RIGHT  EPP    M  82 23.5 3.5  0.83  EPP  EPP 
Italy              V  43 12.3 3.5  0.43  LEFT  SOC 
DS+allies  172  27.3 13.9  3.79  SOC  SOC    KD  42 12.0 3.5  0.42  EPP  EPP 
PPI/CCD  123  19.5 13.9  2.71  EPP  EPP    C  18 5.2 3.5  0.18  LIB  SOC 
FI  123  19.5 13.9  2.71  EPP  EPP    FP  17 4.9 3.5  0.17  LIB  EPP 
AN  93  14.8 13.9  2.05  GAU  EPP    MP  16 4.6 3.5  0.16  GRN  SOC 
LN  59  9.4 13.9  1.30  RIGHT  EPP    Austria         
RC  35  5.6 13.9  0.77  LEFT  SOC    SPO  65 35.5 3.4  1.19  SOC  SOC 
V  21  3.3 13.9  0.46  GRN  SOC    OVP  52 28.4 3.4  0.95  EPP  EPP 
Reg-R  3  0.5 13.9  0.07  EPP  EPP    FPO  52 28.4 3.4  0.95  RIGHT  EPP 
Reg-L  1  0.2 13.9  0.02  GRN  SOC    GRUNE  14 7.7 3.4  0.26  GRN  SOC 
UK              Denmark         
LAB  419  63.6 13.9  8.84  SOC  SOC    S  63 36.0 2.6  0.92  SOC  SOC 
CON  165  25.0 13.9  3.48  EPP  EPP    V  42 24.0 2.6  0.61  LIB  EPP 
LIB  47  7.1 13.9  0.99  LIB  SOC    KF  16 9.1 2.6  0.23  EPP  EPP 
UUP  10  1.5 13.9  0.21  ANTI  EPP    DF  13 7.4 2.6  0.19  ANTI  EPP 
PC  6  0.9 13.9  0.13  GRN  SOC    SF  13 7.4 2.6  0.19  LEFT  SOC 
SNP  4  0.6 13.9  0.08  GRN  SOC    CD  8 4.6 2.6  0.12  EPP  EPP 
DUP  3  0.5 13.9  0.06  ANTI  EPP    RV  7 4.0 2.6  0.10  LIB  SOC 
SDLP  3  0.5 13.9  0.06  SOC  SOC    EL  5 2.9 2.6  0.07  LEFT  SOC 
SF  2  0.3 13.9  0.04  LEFT  SOC    KRF  4 2.3 2.6  0.06  EPP  EPP 
Spain              FRP  4 2.3 2.6  0.06  ANTI  EPP 
PP  156  44.6 10.2  4.56  EPP  EPP    Finland         
PSOE  141  40.3 10.2  4.12  SOC  SOC    SDP  51 25.5 2.6  0.65  SOC  SOC 
IU  21  6.0 10.2  0.61  LEFT  SOC    KESK  50 25.0 2.6  0.64  LIB  SOC 
CiU  16  4.6 10.2  0.47  LIB  EPP    KOK  46 23.0 2.6  0.59  EPP  EPP 
Reg-L  10  2.9 10.2  0.29  GRN  SOC    VAS  20 10.0 2.6  0.26  LEFT  SOC 
Reg-R  6  1.7 10.2  0.18  EPP  EPP    SFP  12 6.0 2.6  0.15  LIB  EPP 
Netherlands            VIHR  11 5.5 2.6  0.14  GRN  SOC 
PvdA  45  30.0 5.0  1.49  SOC  SOC    KD  10 5.0 2.6  0.13  EPP  EPP 
VVD  39  26.0 5.0  1.29  LIB  EPP    Ireland         
CDA  28  18.7 5.0  0.92  EPP  EPP    FF  77 46.4 2.4  1.11  GAU  EPP 
D66  14  9.3 5.0  0.46  LIB  SOC    FG  54 32.5 2.4  0.78  EPP  EPP 
GL  11  7.3 5.0  0.36  GRN  SOC    LAB  17 10.2 2.4  0.25  SOC  SOC 
SGP/G/R  8  5.3 5.0  0.26  ANTI  EPP    IND  6 3.6 2.4  0.09  LIB  EPP 
SP  5  3.3 5.0  0.17  LEFT  SOC    DL  5 3.0 2.4  0.07  LEFT  SOC 
Belgium              PD  4 2.4 2.4  0.06  LIB  EPP 
VLD  23  15.3 4.0  0.61  LIB  EPP    GP  2 1.2 2.4  0.03  GRN  SOC 
CVP  22  14.7 4.0  0.59  EPP  EPP    SF  1 0.6 2.4  0.01  LEFT  SOC 
PS  19  12.7 4.0  0.51  SOC  SOC    Luxembourg         
PRL-FDF  18  12.0 4.0  0.48  LIB  EPP    CSV  19 31.7 1.0  0.30  EPP  EPP 
VB  15  10.0 4.0  0.40  RIGHT  EPP    DP  15 25.0 1.0  0.24  LIB  EPP 
SP  14  9.3 4.0  0.37  SOC  SOC    LSAP  13 21.7 1.0  0.21  SOC  SOC 
ECOLO  11  7.3 4.0  0.29  GRN  SOC    ADR  7 11.7 1.0  0.11  EPP  EPP 
PSC  10  6.7 4.0  0.27  EPP  EPP    GRENG  5 8.3 1.0  0.08  GRN  SOC 
AGALEV  9  6.0 4.0  0.24  GRN  SOC    LENK  1 1.7 1.0  0.02  LEFT  LEFT 
VU  8  5.3 4.0  0.21  GRN  SOC             
FN  1  0.7 4.0  0.03  RIGHT  EPP               34 
 
Table 7. Counterfactual Elections of the Commission President by National Parliaments 
 
 
  1979  1984  1989  1994  1999 
Party  Round 1  Round 2 Round 1 Round 2  Round 1 Round 2 Round 1  Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 
LEFT  10.9    15.1    2.9    4.2    5.1   
GRN          2.1    2.2    3.9   
SOC  30.3  43.3  28.3  47.0  41.4  48.4  31.3  41.1  41.8  53.1 
REG  4.7    1.9    0.7    0.9       
ANTI              0.3    0.8   
LIB  10.8    9.6    10.6    8.1    7.6   
EPP  25.8  56.7  25.7  53.0  35.8  51.6  36.1  58.9  31.4  46.9 
FE              2.4       
CON  11.3    12.3               
GAU  9.0    5.1    5.3    8.6    6.8   
RIGHT  1.4    2.0    1.3    5.9    2.7   
 
 
Note: The proportion of seats of a party in a national parliament is weighted by the proportion of MEPs from that member state.   35 
Table 8. Summary of Results 
 
 
  EP1-1979  EP2-1984  EP3-1989  EP4-1994  EP5-1999 
Real World  (Jenkins+Thorn)  (Delors I)  (Delors II+III)  (Santer)  (Prodi) 
Commission majority  Right  Right  Right  Right  Left 
Counterfactual Analysis           
Election by EP of …           
(1) Com. President (EP group voting) 
 
Right (EPP)  Right (EPP)  Right (EPP)  Left (SOC)  Right (EPP) 
(2) Com. President (Individual MEP voting) 
 
Right (EPP)  Right (EPP)  Centre (LIB)  Left (SOC)  Centre (LIB) 




















Election by National Parliament of …           
(5) Commission President 
 
Right (EPP)  Right (EPP)  Right (EPP)  Right (EPP)  Left (SOC) 
 
 